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Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life: WIDOW 
DENIED RECOVERY ON ACCIDEN-
TAL DEAm POUCYWHEN 
HUSBAND DIED FROM AIDS 
CONTAMINATED TRANSFUSION. 
In Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life, 315 Md. 
761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989), the Coun of 
Appeals of Maryland barred an insured 
widow's recovery under an accidental 
death policy after her husband died of 
AIDS (Acquired Immune DefiCiency Syn-
drome) which he accidentaUycontracted 
from a necessary blood transfusion. The 
coun held that hemophilia was a "sick-
ness or disease" within the meaning of a 
policywbich excluded recovery for death 
by "sickness or disease." Id. at 770, 556 
A.2d at 1140. Thus, the coun deemed 
that accidentally contracting AIDS while 
under medical treatment for a sickness or 
disease such as hemophilia was not the 
type of "accident" contemplated in the 
insurance policy. 
Petitioner is the surviving spouse of 
Anthony Cheney, who suffered from 
hemophilia. While undergoing a treat-
ment for hemophilia, Mr. Cheney re-
ceived a transfusion containing the AIDS 
virus. At the age of24, he died of respira-
tory failure, a direct consequence of the 
AIDS virus. 
When Mr. Cheney died, he and his wife 
jointly held an accidental death policy 
under which the insurance company 
agreed to pay a designated amount in the 
event of the accidental death of either 
pany. Upon Mr. Cheney's death, how-
ever, the insurance company refused 
payment assening that his death was not 
"accidental" as defined in the policy. 
Cheney, 70 Md. App. at 164-65, 520A.2d 
at 403. The policy excluded "any loss 
. . . caused by or resulting from . . . 
sickness or disease or medical or surgical 
treatment therefore (sic) .... " Cheney, 
315 Md. at 763, 556A.2d at 1136. 
Mrs. Cheney filed suit in the Circuit 
Coun for Baltimore City claiming that 
her husband's death was accidental. 
Judge Elsbeth Bothe granted the insur-
ance company's motion for summary 
judgment based on its assenions that Mr. 
Cheney'S death resulted from sickness or 
disease, or from medical treatment. The 
coun of special appeals affirmed, also 
suggesting that no "accident" had oc-
curred within the meaning ofthe policy. 
Id. at 764, 556 A.2d at 1137. 
The coun of appeals began its analysis 
by rejecting the insurance company's 
contention that coverage was excluded 
because death resulted from a sickness or 
disease.Id. (relying on General Account-
ing Co. v. Homely, 109 Md. 93, 99,71 A. 
524 (1908». In GeneralAccounting, the 
coun of appeals held that where death 
resulting from a disease is caused by an 
accident, the accident is the true and 
predominant cause of death. As a result, 
the disease is merely a link in the chain of 
causation. Cheney, 315 Md. at 764,556 
A.2d at 1137. 
The coun of appeals then considered 
whether the insured's death resulted 
from medical treatment for sickness or 
disease. The coun first determined that 
the accidental injury occurred when the 
contaminated blood was injected into 
Mr. Cheney and found unpersuasive Mrs. 
Cheney's argument that the accident 
occurred when the blood was drawn 
from the infected donor. Mrs. Cheney 
reasoned that the accident causing death 
occurred prior to any medical treatment 
for hemophilia. She argued, therefore, 
that the exclusion in the policy did not 
apply.Id. at 766, 556 A.2d at 1138. 
Concluding that death resulted from 
the transfusion, namely, from the medi-
cal treatment for hemophilia, the coun 
was faced with the question of whether 
the insured's hemophilia was a "sickness 
or disease" within the meaning of the 
policy.Id. To determine the meaning of 
the policy, the coun looked to the inten-
tion of the panies which is ascenained 
from the policy as a whole. Under this 
construction, words are accorded their 
usual, ordinary and accepted meaning, 
unless there is evidence to the contrary. 
Id. (relying on Pacific Indem. v. Inter-
state Fire & Casualty, 302 Md. 383, 388, 
488 A.2d 486 (1985». 
The coun found no ambiguity in the 
meaning of the word "disease." The coun 
noted that there was no evidence of any 
contrary or specific meaning and focused 
on the ordinary meaning of the word 
"disease." The coun concluded that 
hemophilia was a "disease" within its 
commonly accepted meaning, and 
within the meaning of the insurance 
policy under which Mr. Cheney was 
covered. Id. at 770, 556A.2d at 1140. Be-
cause Mr. Cheney's death resulted from 
medical treatment for a disease, Mrs. 
Cheney was precluded from receiving 
payment under the policy's exclusionary 
language. 
The coun of appeals concluded that 
the cause of Mr. Cheney'S death was an 
accidental injury. However, because 
hemophilia was a disease within the 
meaning ofthe Cheney's insurance pol-
icy, the injury (receiving AIDS contami-
nated blood) was cause by medical treat-
ment for a disease. Therefore, the acci-
dent was not covered by the accidental 
death policy. Consequently, the coun of 
appeals has narrowly construed the 
meaning of "accidental" in death poli-
cies. As a result, the insurance industry'S 
liability under such policies, specifically 
with regard to AIDS related death, has 
been limited. 
----Eugenia Reed Oshrine 
State v. Gorman: COURT UPHOLDS 
THE USE OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES TO STRIKE BlACK 
JURORS WHEN mE DEFENDANT IS 
WHITE 
InState v. Gonnan, 315 Md. 402, 554 
A.2d 1203 (1989), the Coun of Appeals 
of Maryland held that the state's exercise 
of peremptory challenges to strike the 
only two black jurors from a jury panel 
was constitutionally permissible when 
the defendant in question was white. 
Gorman, a male caucasian, was con-
victed by a jury in the Circuit Coun for 
Harford County of robbery with a deadly 
weapon and related offenses. During 
voin dire, the prosecution exercised its 
perem ptory challenges to strike the only 
two black veniremen from the panel. 
Gorman was sentenced to life imprison-
ment without parole, pursuant to Mary-
land's recidivist statute. Id. at 404, 554 
A.2d at 1204. 
On appeal, Gorman contended that 
the state's use of peremptory challenges 
to strike the black veniremen from the 
panel constituted a denial of equal pro-
tection in violation of the founeenth 
amendment and a violation of the sixth 
amendment's guarantee of an impanial 
jury. The coun of special appeals af-
firmed his conviction. After the coun of 
appeals denied ceniorari, the Supreme 
Coun of the United States granted Gor-
man's petition for ceniorari. The SUo 
preme Coun vacated the judgment of the 
intermediate appellate coun and re-
manded the case to that coun for recon-
sideration in light of the recent holding 
in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 
(1987). On remand, the coun of special 
appeals reversed, and remanded it for a 
new trial, relying on Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986), Griffith, and Chew v. 
State, 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332, 
cert. granted, 311 Md. 301, 534A.2d 369 
(1987), for its decision. After the coun of 
special appeals denied the state's motion 
for reconsideration, the coun of appeals 
granted both the state's petition and 
Gorman's cross petition for writs of 
ceniorari. Gonnan, 315 Md. at 404-405, 
554 A.2d at 1204. On appeal, the panies 
'stipulated that there were only three 
issues: 
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